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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
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
6 MARCH 1974

*Donner*  
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**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**



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6 MARCH 1974

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FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

## CONTENTS

### ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

Gromyko Visits Stress Bilateral Relations, Peace Settlement. . . . 1

### ENERGY CRISIS

Moscow Continues Low-Keyed Criticism of U.S. Policy. . . . . 7

### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Sees "Very Promising Prospects" for Cooperation . . . . . 9

### VIETNAM

DRV, PRG Notes Condemn U.S., GVN on Paris "Act" Anniversary. . . . 11

U.S. "Blatant Sabotage" at Geneva Law Conference Assailed. . . . . 12

### PRC-TAIWAN

Peking Revives Strong Determination to "Liberate" Taiwan . . . . . 15

### CHINA

Attack on Opera Indicts Provincial Cultural Officials. . . . . 18

Peking Stresses Ideological Incentives to Boost Farm Output. . . . 20

### USSR

Ultraconservative Editors Purged From Journal OKTYABR. . . . . 21

### NOTES

New Yugoslav Constitution; PRAVDA on Diego Garcia Base . . . . . 23

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . . 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 1 -

## ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

### GROMYKO VISITS STRESS BILATERAL RELATIONS, PEACE SETTLEMENT

Gromyko's visits to Damascus and Cairo, at a time when Secretary Kissinger was making his fourth visit to the Middle East, denote an effort by Moscow to shore up its sagging relations with Syria and Egypt and to reassert a Soviet role in the ongoing efforts to arrange an Arab-Israeli settlement. Arab media had carried reports in late January, after Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's talks in Moscow, that Gromyko would visit Cairo and Damascus in February. But Moscow had not mentioned the visits until it announced on 27 February that Gromyko had left for Damascus.\*

Two major commentators made efforts to link Soviet diplomatic activity with the Kissinger mission. PRAVDA's Yuriy Zhukov, in a Moscow domestic service program on 2 March, remarked that Gromyko's and Kissinger's visits were "understandable" since the Soviet Union and the United States are co-chairmen of the Geneva conference. Middle East expert Primakov took exception, in the weekly Moscow radio observers' roundtable on the 3d, to "Western press" assessments that the Secretary was bringing about a settlement through personal diplomacy. Primakov argued that the success of any U.S. statesman, including Kissinger, depended on preparatory work and "especially" on the "active policy" of the Soviet Union which made possible a chain of events from the Middle East ceasefire to the Geneva conference and subsequently the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement.

While Moscow has been careful not to criticize the steps already achieved in the disengagement process, it has repeatedly declared that disengagement is only a first step to a general settlement. Gromyko in the course of his Damascus and Cairo visits is not known to have made any specific mention of disengagement, but he did stress the Soviet interest in complete Israeli withdrawal, cautioning Syria and Egypt that "opponents of a just peace" saw "so-called 'partial solutions'" as a device enabling Israel to retain the captured territories. He also warned against attempts to weaken Arab unity and separate the Arabs from their socialist friends and allies.

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\* Judging from a report by the West German news agency on 27 February, the Syrian part of the trip may have been hastily arranged: DPA said German embassy officials in Moscow were surprised to learn that Gromyko had left Moscow immediately after the arrival there of FRG Minister Bahr for talks with the Soviet foreign minister. TASS as well as DPA reported that Brezhnev received Bahr on 27 February.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 2 -

GROMYKO IN EGYPT Gromyko's pointed remarks on Soviet-Egyptian relations in his few public statements and Moscow's descriptions of the "businesslike" atmosphere of the discussions in Cairo come against the background of continuing Soviet complaints, in Arabic-language broadcasts, about economic trends encouraging private enterprise and foreign investment, as well as sniping at what was described as Cairo press criticism of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty. The communique on the 1-5 March "official, cordial visit" described the atmosphere as "cordial and constructive"; Gromyko himself, in his departure statement, said merely that he had held "useful" talks in a "friendly, business-like atmosphere."\* TASS, briefly reporting Gromyko's four-hour meeting with as-Sadat on the 2d, said they discussed a "wide range of questions on bilateral relations" and that in the course of a "friendly exchange of opinions" on a Middle East settlement the Egyptian president expressed "high appreciation" of Soviet support for the Arabs.

Moscow media publicized short reports of Gromyko's public statements but, following past practice, provided only brief accounts of his activities. Supporting comment on his Syrian and Egyptian visits and on Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn's recent talks in Moscow played up Soviet diplomatic activity in search of a Mideast solution and stressed the "special importance" of Soviet-Arab cooperation in this regard. Cairo media reported on various aspects of the visit and comment emphasized the continued need for strengthening Soviet-Egyptian relations. However, neither Cairo nor the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY carried any accounts of Gromyko's speech at a luncheon on the 4th given by Foreign Minister Fahmi, although Fahmi's speech was reported.

Gromyko Statements: In his luncheon speech, according to TASS, Gromyko said with respect to present Soviet-Egyptian relations that "a drifting apart must not be permitted; every available good opportunity for moving forward must be taken." He pledged that the Soviet Union would work in that direction and added that "if" Egypt did also, Soviet-Egyptian friendship would be as strong as the foundations of the pyramids. Against the background

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\* Gromyko last led delegations to Cairo in June 1969 and December 1968; communiques on both visits described the atmosphere as one of "mutual friendship" and on departure Gromyko on both occasions expressed himself as very satisfied with the talks. Gromyko was last in Cairo as a member of Podgorny's delegation in May 1971 when the Soviet-Egyptian treaty was signed.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 3 -

of resumption of U.S.-Egyptian relations on 28 February during Kissinger's visit,\* Gromyko obliquely remarked that the furthering of Soviet-Egyptian friendship "must not hinder or harm any other countries which truly support peace and international detente."

At a mass meeting at the Hulwan metallurgical combine the same day, Gromyko outlined the aim of his visit as promoting the strengthening of "everything good" in Egyptian-Soviet relations and defining the possibilities for furthering them. He went on to say that this could be achieved "if both sides strive for it" not only in words but also--"and I stress" this--in deeds.

Joint Communique: Like the communique on Foreign Minister Fahmi's January talks in Moscow, the concluding document on Gromyko's visit placed emphasis on the sides' desire to continue strengthening their friendship and cooperation on the basis of the May 1971 treaty. The present communique also pledged the sides' determination to "prevent the undermining" of their relations. The communique echoed the January one in asserting the necessity for the Soviet Union to participate in all stages of a Middle East settlement, including the working committees formed by the Geneva conference. The sides held "detailed debates" on the Middle East situation, again calling for implementation of Security Council resolution 242 of November 1967 and 338 of October 1973, and describing Egyptian-Israeli disengagement as a first step toward this aim.

In the communique, the sides' stressed the need for regular exchange of views and "coordination of steps" between the two countries, whether in bilateral relations or with respect to the international situation, particularly Middle East developments. As in January there was no indication of any discussions of military aid. However, an account of Fahmi's talks in Moscow in the 26 January AL-AHRAM said that "steps for future action" were discussed, including "future military cooperation" between Egypt and the USSR to strengthen Egypt's military abilities.

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\* A broadcast in Arabic on 1 March reviewed Washington's "hostile attitude" to the Arabs since 1967 and explained Egypt's decision on resumption of relations as due to Cairo's hope that this would lead to removal of all obstacles to "the securing of the Arab people's legitimate rights."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

EBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 4 -

President as-Sadat renewed an invitation to Brezhnev to visit Egypt, previously extended in communiques in 1971 and 1972. As in the January communique on Fahmi's visit, the current document contained no Egyptian expression of gratitude for Soviet support of the Arabs nor Soviet pledge of continued support. The communique did record Egypt's appreciation of Soviet "preparedness in principle" to participate in Suez Canal repair work.

Egyptian Economic Policies: In his remarks in Hulwan, Gromyko implied that the industrial complex being developed there with Soviet support provided a model for the Egyptian economy. The complex provided a basis, he said, for further development of the state sector, "without which progressive socioeconomic changes are impossible." Soviet broadcasts in Arabic have frequently warned against possible Western economic "penetration" of Egypt. A Moscow commentary on the 26th deplored a "Western" campaign against Egypt's policy of industrialization and strengthening of the public sector, claiming the West was trying to steer Egypt toward agricultural investment and was also arguing that industry could not be profitable if, as in Egypt, industrial installations belonged to the state. And a broadcast in Arabic two days later extolling the virtues of the public sector in helping pull Egypt out of its economic difficulties noted that the government was allowing private capital to participate in its extensive reconstruction program and was seeking loans from foreign, including Western, countries. The commentary pointed out that "far-sighted" Egyptian economists emphasized that utilization of such sources should under no circumstances affect the intensification of state control over most important sectors of the economy, particularly in view of the "intensified campaign in Egypt and the West" for less state control and more leeway for private Egyptian and foreign capital in economic activity.

GROMYKO IN SYRIA      Brief Moscow reportage on the first phase of Gromyko's talks with the Syrians indicated a shade more warmth than was demonstrated in Cairo. Paying his first visit to Syria, Gromyko said on arrival on the 27th, according to TASS, that discussions would concern bilateral relations and the question of a Middle East settlement. He remarked that with the Mideast problem entering the period of political settlement, "many new questions naturally arise" and the coordination of efforts assumes "particular topicality." He returned to this theme in a speech at a luncheon on the 28th given by Foreign Minister Khaddam, stressing that the "new conditions" of the

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 5 -

struggle for peace demand "particular care" for unity and coordination by the Arabs and their friends. He cautioned, as he did in his luncheon speech in Cairo later, about attempts by "opponents" of a just peace to try to split the Arabs and disrupt their friendship with their allies.

TASS in a short report on Gromyko's meetings with President al-Asad and other Syrian leaders on the 28th said the talks had been held in a "cordial, comradely atmosphere." Departing 1 March for Cairo, Gromyko expressed satisfaction and confidence that the forthcoming talks on his return from Cairo would be held in a similar atmosphere. Gromyko in effect shadowed Kissinger in his round of visits: He arrived in Damascus after the Secretary's first visit there on 26-27 February, he arrived in Cairo on 1 March as Kissinger left, and he returned to Damascus on the 5th following the Secretary's second visit there.

While Gromyko did not publicly address the issue of Syrian-Israeli disengagement and the problems involved, Soviet commentators have mentioned the issue in discussions of the visit. Primakov in the observers roundtable on Moscow domestic service on the 3d saw disengagement on the Syrian front as desirable but insisted that it should be followed by steps toward a lasting settlement based on complete Israeli withdrawal. Expressing disagreement with "Western press" assessments that the main obstacle to disengagement talks had been removed with Syrian presentation of a list of Israeli POWs, Primakov called the POW issue only a "technicality." And a Sergey Losev commentary broadcast in English to North America on 27 February observed that disengagement talks did not depend on the POW issue but on Israel's "agreement to get out."

Neither Soviet nor Damascus media have yet mentioned the agreement, reported in the Western press, for indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel in Washington with Secretary Kissinger as intermediary. A Syrian official on a visit to Saudi Arabia was reported by Riyadh radio on the 4th as confirming that Kissinger would hold "bilateral consultations" with Syria and Israel. The West German agency DPA reported on the 6th that Gromyko was urging the Syrians to arrange for the talks on the Golan Heights problem to be held in Geneva with Soviet participation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 6 -

GROMYKO AND PALESTINIANS

The joint Soviet-Egyptian communique called for Palestinian participation in the Geneva conference, along the lines of the January communique on Fahmi's Moscow visit. In a passage that underscored Soviet support for the Palestinians, the communique said Gromyko had received Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Cairo for a discussion of matters connected with safeguarding the Palestinian people's legitimate rights. The discussion, it said, was held in an atmosphere of "mutual friendship and understanding." TASS had earlier carried a brief report on the meeting, and a Cairo Voice of Palestine broadcast on the 3d had reported that the head of the PLO political department, Faruq Qaddumi, also attended. MENA on the 5th reported Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi as having stated that it was clear, during his discussions with Gromyko, that the Soviet Union considers the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 7 -

## ENERGY CRISIS

## MOSCOW CONTINUES LOW-KEYED CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICY

Since the Washington conference in early February, Moscow has avoided detailed discussion of the international oil crisis, but has projected a generally critical interpretation of Western and, particularly, U.S. policies by selective reporting and a few polemical articles. Soviet media gave only cursory treatment to the 25 February meeting called as a follow-up to the Washington conference, and to President Nixon's news conference the same day. Similarly routine treatment has been accorded the 4 March decision of the European Communities to offer long-term economic cooperation to the Arab countries and to the U.S. dissatisfaction with this move. At the same time, several signed articles in the central press have offered a broad criticism of U.S. policies, focused, however, on standard polemical themes rather than on the specific substance of recent U.S. actions.

Soviet bloc media during the past winter have regularly emphasized the need for stepped-up efforts to conserve energy resources, hailing at the same time successes in the discovery of new sources of energy and in increasing power output to meet the demands of expanding economies. The comment has stressed that there has been no crisis in the Soviet bloc countries to compare with that in capitalist states, and there have been no further announcements of energy rationing following those in Romania, Poland, and Bulgaria in November.

The signed articles published in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in late February combined attacks on U.S. policy with praise for Arab efforts to gain control over international oil companies. In a 28 February IZVESTIYA article, for example, Vladimir Kudryavtsev asserted that the United States welcomed the energy crisis as a means to revive the Western alliance in a new form. In this way, Kudryavtsev maintained, "the most reactionary circles in the capitalist world" hoped to strengthen resistance to the peace offensive of the socialist countries and progressive forces. The PRAVDA article by N. Turkatenko on the 28th, referring to Arab moves to nationalize international oil companies, contended that these moves were justified by the right of every country to dispose of its riches and represented "an integral part of the principles of peaceful coexistence."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 8 -

SOVIET POLICY  
ON ENERGY

Moscow continues to give hints of Soviet interest in the convening of an international oil conference, although no formal initiative on the issue has been taken. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's announcement in Paris two weeks ago that the USSR advocated international talks on energy problems is the only official statement available to date. Soviet support in the United Nations for the convening of a special 9 April UN General Assembly session on raw materials, sponsored by Algeria, has apparently been acknowledged only on Moscow radio foreign-language broadcasts.

Meanwhile, the idea continues to be mentioned in a speculative way by Soviet commentators. IZVESTIYA commentator A. Bovins, for example, on 23 February cited in favorable terms the views of former U.S. representative to the United Nations Charles Yost that global economic planning on an unprecedented scale was required. Bovins promptly pointed out, however, that a capitalist society did not provide a proper environment for planning on such a scale and that a radical restructuring of international economic relations was necessary. A Moscow commentator has also evinced concern lest the USSR be left out of consultations undertaken in Europe to deal with energy problems. Soviet historian Yuriy Rubinskiy told Moscow radio's French listeners on 27 February that even though "Soviet ruling circles" supported an international approach, they did not rule out regional European solutions within the framework of a Europe reaching "from the Atlantic to the Urals." The earlier-expressed views of Soviet oil expert Boris Rachkov on an international approach to energy problems have been given only low-level attention in Soviet media.\*

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\* For a discussion of the Rachkov proposal, see the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 9-10.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 9 -

## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW SEES "VERY PROMISING PROSPECTS" FOR COOPERATION

Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev's visit to Washington and new U.S. Ambassador Stoessel's presentation of credentials have been publicized by Moscow in a manner designed to show continuing progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. After a preliminary meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko on 25 February, Stoessel was received by Podgornyy on 4 March and by Brezhnev the next day. Reports of the meetings with Podgornyy and Brezhnev focused on the bright side of the relationship, including Podgornyy's comment, as reported by Moscow radio, that the prospects for cooperation are "very promising" and that "the important thing now is not to relax efforts to further promote Soviet-American relations."

On the issue of trade, Moscow has continued to find a silver lining in the face of congressional opposition to the granting of MFN status and credits to the Soviet Union. Media coverage of the visit by Patolichev and deputy trade minister Alkhimov in connection with the first meeting in Washington of the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council reported progress in discussions of credits with the Administration and in contacts with a number of U.S. firms. PRAVDA's Vishnevskiy on 1 March saw in the first session of the council "a new step forward in the normalization of trade and economic ties between the USA and the USSR." Reporting in similar vein, TASS dispatches on the Senate Finance Committee's hearings on the trade bill, which opened on 4 March, predictably stressed remarks by Administration officials, Senator Fulbright and others calling for an end to restrictions on U.S.-Soviet trade.

Moscow's continued interest in expanded economic relations with the United States and other industrially developed states of the West was also emphasized in a 26 February IZVESTIYA article by prominent Soviet academician O. Bogomolov. He reiterated the advantages of increased Soviet participation in the "international division of labor" along lines laid down in a series of groundbreaking articles that appeared in the central press following the April 1973 CPSU plenum.\* As in the earlier series, Bogomolov argued that the expansion of the Soviet role in the world market would place "new demands" on the Soviet system, requiring both structural changes in the economy and "a certain psychological re-orientation" on the part of economic planners and administrators.

\* The initial articles in this series are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 May 1973, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 10 -

In the course of his argument, Bogomolov indicated that the policy of expanded trade with the West was resisted not only by foreign opponents of detente but also by misguided Soviet officials. Referring to the domestic critics, he observed:

Foreign economic relations are still sometimes thought of as a secondary factor in economic construction. Their effectiveness is viewed only in terms of the Soviet Union's fulfillment of its international commitments to the fraternal socialist countries and the national liberation movement. Such ideas attest to a lack of understanding of the advantages of the international division of labor, which we are increasingly actively placing at the service of the national economy.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 MARCH 1974

- 11 -

## VIETNAM

## DRV, PRG NOTES CONDEMN U.S., GVN ON PARIS "ACT" ANNIVERSARY

The first anniversary of the ratifying "Act" adopted by the February 1973 Paris international conference on Vietnam was marked by DRV and PRG foreign ministry notes on 1 and 2 March which reflect continuing dissatisfaction with U.S. and GVN implementation of the peace agreement. This is the third time that North Vietnam and the PRG have used the format of notes communicated to other countries, rather than foreign ministry or government statements, to register their complaints.\*

The new messages reaffirm that the DRV and the PRG continue to "strictly respect and scrupulously implement" the Paris agreement, in sharp contrast to the "very blatant and systematic" U.S.-Saigon violations. However, previous lengthy lists of violations have been reduced in the current notes to concise generalities referring to the continued U.S. military presence in South Vietnam, increased U.S. military aid, and U.S. "negation" of the PRG's full rights and status set forth in the Paris agreement. Unlike the earlier notes, the current ones ignore Cambodia and Laos, presumably because of the reduction of military action there.

As in the notes last April and October, the PRG on this occasion uses harsher language than the DRV's, and it goes beyond those earlier PRG notes in declaring that "right from the beginning" the United States and the Saigon administration "brazenly and systematically violated many essential provisions" of the agreement. (The DRV note omits this accusation, but it is made in a 2 March NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary.) The PRG note stresses that the "obdurate" U.S. pursuit of the Nixon Doctrine is the "direct root cause" of South Vietnam's current "critical situation," which it says will become even "more serious." Seeming further to imply that it is unlikely the United States can be dissuaded from its course, the PRG omits any appeal to the Paris conferees for help. Such an appeal was voiced in the earlier notes and is repeated in the current DRV communication, which declares optimistically that it is "firmly

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\* In April 1973 the first set of notes was addressed to all 12 Paris conferees, but the second set in October 1973, like the current notes, was addressed only to the USSR, China, Poland, Hungary, France, Britain, Indonesia, and Iran (replacing Canada on the ICCS). The current DRV note, but not the PRG's, was also addressed to the UN Secretary General.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 12 -

convinced" the Paris conference governments will make "positive contributions" to insure implementation of the Paris accord.

The DRV note at the same time complained not only about the increase in the President's request for military aid to the GVN but that the United States "has continued to evade its obligation to contribute to healing the wounds of war in the DRV," had continued to encroach on DRV airspace with reconnaissance planes, and "many officials" have repeatedly "slandered and threatened the Vietnamese people."

Hanoi's continued pessimism about a change of heart in the Nixon Administration was reflected in the 2 March NHAN DAN editorial's assertion that this administration "is still unwilling to learn a lesson from the past" and still resorts to "outmoded, threatening maneuvers against our people." Without specifying the instance or naming any Nixon Administration figure, NHAN DAN noted that "recently it also threatened to reconsider the U.S. obligations cited in the Paris agreement."

#### U.S. "BLATANT SABOTAGE" AT GENEVA LAW CONFERENCE ASSAILED

Sharply worded PRG and DRV foreign ministry statements issued on 2 and 3 March charge the United States with resorting to "every vile trick" to block PRG participation in the Geneva conference on humanitarian international law--an action the statements labeled "blatant violation" of the Paris agreement on Vietnam, the International Act, and the 13 June 1973 Paris joint communique.

The PRG Foreign Ministry statement of 2 March, broadcast the same day, recalled "towering crimes" against the Vietnamese people by the "U.S. imperialists" and noted that the United States sought to prevent PRG participation at Geneva "simply out of fear it would be exposed and condemned." The statement added that "these odious, blatant actions" by the United States "further expose" U.S. attempts to sabotage the Geneva conference goals.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement, issued on 3 March, "vehemently condemned" the U.S. blocking role at the conference, after describing U.S. "crimes" in Vietnam as "even more horrendous than those committed by Hitler in the past." It added that the U.S. Government "fears the presence" of the PRG as the "living witness to the barbarous crimes" committed by the United States in South Vietnam.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 13 -

Referring to the DRV representative's walkout from the conference on 27 February after protesting the U.S. "odious maneuvers," the DRV statement noted that the DRV and PRG would nevertheless continue to expose the "vile intent" of U.S. imperialism and do their best to make further contributions to the common cause of the world people and develop humanitarian law.

Hanoi radio on 2 March had reported the crucial vote the evening of 28 February, noting that 27 delegations voted for the PRG and 38 against, with the other votes blank or abstentions. Hanoi and Liberation Radio on 28 February had reported as a U.S. "defeat" an earlier 64-28 vote against a U.S. proposal that a two-thirds majority be required to seat the PRG delegation and one from Guinea-Bissau.

The likelihood that both the DRV and PRG had remained hopeful until the last minute that the PRG would be seated at Geneva is suggested by the fact that their foreign ministry statements on the first anniversary of the Paris "Act" broadcast 2 March--after the Geneva vote excluding the PRG--omitted any reference to the U.S. blocking role there. A 2 March NHAN DAN editorial, broadcast several hours earlier the same day that the anniversary notes were released, incorporated sharp criticism of the U.S. action. NHAN DAN declared that the U.S. stand at Geneva newly exposed the "extremely odious and cowardly" U.S. attitude toward the PRG and the Paris agreement, and constituted a "blatant violation" of the agreement and the Act.

NHAN DAN laid heavy emphasis on the need for greater international support and recognition of the PRG, noting that "a number of countries" signing the Paris Act had displayed a "completely erroneous attitude" in Geneva on this issue and acted at variance with their obligations under the Act. NHAN DAN "resolutely demanded" that these countries "change their attitude," stop assisting the United States and Saigon, and "prevent" them from sabotaging the Paris agreement.

A DRV stand ruling out simultaneous PRG and GVN participation in the Geneva conference was evident in a 28 February Liberation Radio report on statements by DRV Ambassador Nguyen Van Luu. He was quoted as saying it was "illogical discrimination" contrary to the Paris agreement on Vietnam to invite the "Saigon administration" to Geneva while barring the PRG, adding that the DRV delegation was authorized to declare that the PRG "must be invited to attend" and the Saigon delegates "must be ousted" from the conference. This appeared to contradict an earlier statement by PRG Foreign Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 MARCH 1974

- 14 -

Nguyen Thi Binh, in an interview with a Swedish paper carried by Liberation Radio on 27 February. Binh, while denouncing U.S. efforts to block PRG participation in Geneva, claimed that "the PRG does not protest" the participation of representatives of the South Vietnamese parties in this conference, but that Thieu "lacks the standing" to talk about humanitarian issues because he is a "tool" used by the United States to continue waging war and a policy of repression in South Vietnam.

A LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY commentary following the 28 February vote declared that the U.S. "bribery" and "delay" of the Geneva conference not only "brazenly violate" the Paris agreement and Act of the international conference on Vietnam but also "lessened the humanitarian significance" of the 1949 Geneva conventions and the current Geneva conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

6 MARCH 1974

- 15 -

## PRC-TAIWAN

## PEKING REVIVES STRONG DETERMINATION TO "LIBERATE" TAIWAN

Peking, while continuing to signal its interest in peaceful resolution to the Taiwan problem, recently has revived the specter of forceful reunion to underline its determination that Taiwan eventually will be reunited with the mainland. The new line was evident in speeches by PRC Overseas Chinese expert Liao Cheng-chih and former Kuomintang general Fu Tso-i, marking the 27th anniversary of the 28 February 1947 Taiwan uprising against the Chiang Kai-shek government. The speeches shifted noticeably from last year's theme--that Sino-U.S. reconciliation and growing PRC international stature would eventually compel Taipei to open negotiations with Peking--and instead stressed that Taiwan's reunion with the mainland would result from Chinese determination and PLA preparedness.

The PLA's role, which was ignored last year, was underlined by the presence at this year's meeting of a high-level officer, Deputy Chief of Staff Li Ta. In noting the army's readiness to liberate Taiwan, Fu Tso-i stressed that Peking reserved the right to choose the "means by which we liberate Taiwan," and referred indirectly to U.S. naval withdrawal in raising "a cry of warning" to Taipei that "the Taiwan Straits are today no longer an obstacle to the liberation of Taiwan."\*

Neither Chinese spokesman indicated any specific plan for PLA action concerning Taiwan, stressing the army's general defensive "vigilance" and "readiness." By using such evidence of Chinese resolve, they strove to admonish officials and people on Taiwan not to miss the present "opportunity" to promote "peaceful liberation" of the island. Both duly reiterated recent themes of reconciliation and great patriotic unity in calling for continued Taiwanese visits to the mainland and in advising that whether they come forward early or late, "all patriots belong to one big family." They also appeared to

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\* The PLA was last authoritatively linked with the liberation of Taiwan in a 1970 Army Day speech by then Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, who said "the Chinese people and Chinese PLA are determined to liberate our sacred territory Taiwan."

CONFIDENTIAL

6 MARCH 1974

- 16 -

reflect a stiffening in Peking's attitude toward the top members of the Chiang government, in contrast to last year when Peking pointedly sanctioned reconciliation with Chiang by noting the precedent of Mao's talks in Chungking in 1945. This year Liao Cheng-chih referred harshly to the "Chiang family dynasty" and acknowledged that in Taipei "a few are traitors" who will not work for reunification.

Peking's harder line was also directed against alleged foreign intervention on the island, particularly by the USSR and rightwing groups in Japan. By contrast, last year the Chinese had confidently endeavored to show that the Sino-U.S. agreement in the Shanghai communique implied that Washington would not allow another foreign force to interfere on the island. This time Liao Cheng-chih warned Taipei against attempting to "flirt" with Moscow and indirectly denounced Japanese rightists in noting that "a handful of die-hards abroad" are "still vainly attempting to dip their fingers in the pie of Taiwan." A 1 February NCNA article had used similar language to denounce advances to Taiwan by the "Seirankai"--a rightwing LDP faction in Japan.

**BACKGROUND** While Peking's harder line may reflect a shift brought about by impatience over the lack of a Taipei response to PRC calls for negotiations over Taiwan, Peking's low-level attention to this theme over the past year had suggested the Chinese were building gradually for a long-term effort and had not expected a quick response from Taipei. The strong criticism of the Chiang government's support of Confucius at this year's gathering clearly implied that the ongoing PRC domestic campaign against Confucius and Lin Piao has brought a general stiffening in Peking's approach toward Taipei. The Confucius campaign's impact on policy toward Taiwan was evident as early as 1 February, when an NCNA report labeled Chiang "a political mummy long spurned by the Chinese people"--personally derogatory language that had not been used by Peking in two years. An article in RED FLAG No. 2, replayed by NCNA on 7 February, marked the first major Peking criticism in recent years pegged directly to Chiang Kai-shek. It denounced Chiang's personal support for Confucianism in his 1974 New Year's address.

The concurrent revived stress on Chinese resolve to rebuff foreign intervention on Taiwan is in step with Peking's recent demonstration of increased concern over foreign--particularly Soviet and Japanese--interest in Taiwan.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
6 MARCH 1974

- 17 -

Following its major shift on the Taiwan issue in the 14 November 1973 Sino-U.S. communique,\* Peking showed sensitivity to persistent foreign speculation of a softening of PRC resolve on Taiwan by lashing out at Soviet and Japanese interference. Notably, a 14 December NCNA article condemned Soviet contacts with Taipei for the first time in over a year, while a 2 February PEOPLE'S DAILY article criticizing the Seirankai forcefully revived long dormant charges that rightwing elements in Japan "incessantly entertain the ambition of seizing the Chinese territory of Taiwan."

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\* The change in Peking's position is discussed in the 14 November 1973 TRENDS, pages 10-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

6 MARCH 1974

- 18 -

## CHINA

## ATTACK ON OPERA INDICTS PROVINCIAL CULTURAL OFFICIALS

An article by Chu Lan, published in the 28 February PEOPLE'S DAILY as well as the March issue of RED FLAG, has sharply criticized the Shansi "concocters and supporters" of the opera "Three Visits to Taofeng," apparently a thinly veiled rewrite of an opera discredited during the cultural revolution. Chu, author of recent articles criticizing Western music and defending model operas, has taken the assault against Confucius and Lin Piao one step closer to designating active officials as targets of the campaign by indicating that officials (still unnamed) of the Shansi provincial cultural bureau are guilty of trying to reverse the verdict on Lin and Liu Shao-chi.

The Shansi opera was performed in Peking at the recently concluded North China theatrical festival held under the auspices of the Cultural Group under the State Council, headed by Politburo member Wu Te. There is no evidence at this stage of the campaign that the new attacks on active provincial cultural officials endangers Wu or any other central leader. The Peking theatrical festival is in fact credited with first exposing and criticizing the Shansi opera now under public attack. More than two weeks before the festival ended, a 31 January NCNA report on the proceedings specifically criticized certain "revisionist ideas" expressed by representatives from Shansi. NCNA singled out "comrades of the Shansi delegation" for having revealed that fear exists in literary and art circles over whether to "completely expose" contradictions in creating model revolutionary theatrical works.

A major factor in the criticism of "Three Visits to Taofeng" is that it was based on works encouraged by Lin's wife Wang Kuang-mei and criticized during the cultural revolution as attacks on the Tachai agricultural experience. Wang had tried to popularize a rival to Tachai, the Taoyuan brigade, as a Liuist agricultural model. According to the Chu Lan article, a 1966 version of the opera was even entitled "Three Visits to Taoyuan." The plot relates how an agricultural brigade palmed off a sick horse on another brigade in the spring of 1959. The sick horse, which apparently represents Mao's great leap forward and the Tachai experience, eventually dies and is replaced by a healthy horse, which according to Chu represents the return to capitalism fomented by Wang.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 19 -

The Chu Lan article seems certain to trigger purges of cultural officials at the provincial level, at least within the Creation Group of the Shansi Provincial Cultural Bureau, where the opera was collectively written. Chu Lan charged that "ironclad proof" exists showing that "Three Trips to Taofeng" was a product of a purposeful conspiracy. Shansi reaction to the Chu Lan article thus far indicates that any purges conducted will be carried out under party control and in an orderly manner. A provincial directive broadcast over Taiyuan radio on 1 March supported Chu Lan's charges and called upon Shansi party committees to lead the masses in criticizing the opera. A mass rally held in Taiyuan the same day was clearly under party control and was addressed by party, army, and opera officials. Han Ying, a secretary of the provincial party committee, stated that no action would be taken against the performers, and an official of the Shansi opera theater narrowed the blame to leaders in "certain cultural departments in our province."

Subsequent Shansi comment has highlighted the opera's opposition to the Tachai experience, linking the cultural struggle more closely with the need to follow the correct economic line. A 4 March Taiyuan report of a rally in Hsiyang county (site of the Tachai brigade) directly linked the struggle over the opera with the struggle over popularizing the Tachai example, possibly indicating some factions in Shansi oppose Tachai chief Chen Yung-kuei, who is also a Shansi provincial party secretary as well as the only member of the Politburo currently speaking out extensively on domestic issues. According to the 4 March rally report, provincial cultural authorities turned down for presentation a program by the Hsiyang county opera troupe which reflected the Tachai spirit and charged that the "heroic figures" in the opera "are scoundrels."

Several provinces have now joined in the attack against "Three Visits to Taofeng," with two provincial radios--Nanchang and Tsinan--picking out local operas for criticism. A Nanchang broadcast on 28 February carried a letter from local workers noting the failure of certain provincial cultural leaders to act against a bad opera entitled "Case No. 302." The staging of this opera was characterized as an "antagonistic act" aimed at "settling old scores" with the campaign to reform literature and art "personally" led by Chiang Ching.\* Tsinan radio on 1 March lashed out at

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\* This reference to Chiang Ching, and another by Harbin radio on the same day, are the first open-media allusions to Chiang's cultural role this year.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 20 -

"Turbulent Beach," a local Shantung opera with "grave political errors" which must be criticized. The drama was faulted for incorrectly representing party leadership as "weak and feeble."

#### PEKING STRESSES IDEOLOGICAL INCENTIVES TO BOOST FARM OUTPUT

The annual PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on spring farming, published on 3 March, shows effects of the ideological campaign to criticize Lin Biao and Confucius, but does not seem to portend major changes in agricultural production relations. The editorial called for continued implementation of the "party's basic line and policies during the entire period of socialism," a formulation which would seem to preclude a sudden shift toward a great-leap attempt to achieve communism.

The basic change in emphasis this year is that the editorial stresses only ideological incentives to spur increased production, explaining that the peasants' enthusiasm for socialism, aroused by the Confucius campaign, will bring new achievements in both revolution and production. By contrast, the 1972 and 1973 editorials sought to foster such enthusiasm with injunctions to implement party policies under actual local conditions, a reiteration of the moderate economic line of recent years which allowed peasants' income to rise in step with increases in production in their local production units.

This year's editorial briefly noted the "fine" agricultural situation, called for following the Tachai example, stated that cadres must actively participate in labor, and said that production teams must be given "help" in growing crops rationally in accord with state plans, help which would seem to signify an attempt to reduce production team autonomy in this area. The editorial devoted little attention to actual farming problems and gave no indication of which crops are to be given priority this year; even the traditional "grain is the key" slogan was not sounded. It also failed to mention several subjects and slogans usually accorded attention. Mao's eight-point charter for agriculture went unnoticed, as did the five-year plan, now in its fourth year.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 21 -

## U S S R

## ULTRACONSERVATIVE EDITORS PURGED FROM JOURNAL OKTYABR

The death in early November of Vsevolod Kochetov, notorious neo-Stalinist chief editor of OKTYABR, has paved the way for a major shakeup in the leadership of the literary journal apparently aimed at moderating its militant ultraconservatism. Four of the 11 members of the editorial board--including neo-Stalinist deputy chief editor Petr Strokov--have been dropped, and three new editors have been added. Although the editorial board remains in predominantly conservative hands, new chief editor Anatoliy Ananyev has notably steered clear of literary controversies in the past. Of the other newcomers, deputy chief editor V.V. Karpov is unknown, while editor Grigoriy Baklanov is the first writer with anti-Stalinist credentials to be represented on the editorial board in many years.

The changes were revealed in the January 1974 issue of OKTYABR, the first issue prepared after Kochetov's death on 5 November. In addition to Strokov, those removed from the editorial board were N.A. Gorbachev, deputy chief editor during 1969-71, V.S. Gordeychev, and M.D. Mikhalev. Among incumbents remaining on the editorial board are such outspoken conservatives as S.P. Babayevskiy, S.A. Vasilyev, editorial board secretary Yu. V. Idashkin, D.F. Kraminov and A.A. Perventsev.

New chief editor Ananyev is a conservative 49-year old writer who formerly served as deputy chief editor of the Moscow journal ZNAMYA for several years. He was elected a secretary of the RSFSR writers union at its March 1970 congress. He has written on antireligious themes, World War II, and the 1970 "Dvina" military exercise which he attended. He won praise in the March 1971 OKTYABR for a 1969 novel that justified the liquidation of the kulaks during collectivization and refuted writings sympathetic to the plight of the kulaks. The novel is his only work published in OKTYABR in recent years. Like other journal editors and writers union officials, he joined in the recent campaign against Solzhenitsyn, approving his expulsion in a letter in the 16 February KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Baklanov, on the other hand, has shown signs of unorthodoxy in the past. His novel on World War II, "July 1941," caused a considerable stir in 1965 for its portrayal of Stalin's military failures and its extensive treatment of the 1937 purge. The novel

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

6 MARCH 1974

- 22 -

was published in the January and February 1965 issues of ZNAMYA--before Ananyev's tenure on the editorial board--and was severely criticized in OKTYABR. Baklanov is the first writer of moderate persuasion to serve on OKTYABR's board in many years. The last such writer, Vladimir Maksimov, served briefly in 1967 and was censured in 1968 for protesting the trial of dissidents Ginsburg and Galanskov. In recent months he has been under attack together with Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, and he has just been allowed to leave the Soviet Union.

Under Kochetov, chief editor since 1961, OKTYABR gained notoriety for its bitter polemics with liberal writers--especially those associated with NOVY MIR--and with ultraconservative slavophiles. In recent years it has also repeatedly feuded with LITERARY GAZETTE, organ of the USSR writers union. OKTYABR's quarrelsomeness even taxed the patience of its parent organization, the ultraconservative RSFSR writers union, which according to its chairman Sergey Mikhalkov in the 2 February 1972 LITERARY GAZETTE censured the journal for "serious errors" and instituted marginal changes in its editorial collegium. In the 13 April 1972 IZVESTIYA Mikhalkov singled out Strokov for conducting group vendettas. But no major move was made against the journal during Kochetov's lifetime, presumably because of the support he enjoyed among reactionary party officials.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 23 -

## NOTES

NEW YUGOSLAV CONSTITUTION: Moscow and its orthodox East European allies have shown little enthusiasm for the new Yugoslav constitution adopted on 21 February, which includes such controversial features as a strengthening of "workers self-management" and a rotating presidency after Tito's departure from the scene. In brief and somewhat belated messages of greetings to Tito, the Soviet and East European leaders went through the motions of congratulating Belgrade for its success in "building socialism," without at the same time mentioning any specific features of the new constitution. The Soviet leaders' message wished success in building socialism to the Yugoslav people "and their vanguard, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia." This implicit reminder to the Yugoslavs of the orthodox tenet of the communist party's leading role is in tune with the consistent theme in Soviet comment that Belgrade's problems with liberalism and nationalism during the past two years were due in large part to its failure to strengthen the LCY's leading role in Yugoslav society. Ceausescu's 23 February message, while similarly hewing to generalities, was notably more effusive in expressing Romania's "sincere rejoicing" over Yugoslavia's "outstanding successes" in the past and its conviction that the new constitution will promote the building of both "socialism" and "communism."

PRAVDA ON DIEGO GARCIA BASE: An article in the 27 February PRAVDA on U.S. plans to expand military facilities on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean, while published under the authoritative byline Observer, essentially repeats stock themes of earlier radio and press comment. Thus, the article charges that the United States is threatening the peace and independence of countries in the area; says that Soviet military activities in the Indian Ocean pose no threat, and the USSR has adopted a favorable position on the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone; and claims that Peking is "waging a slander campaign against Soviet foreign policy" and justifying the Pentagon actions while seeking to establish its own military presence in the area.

CONFIDENTIAL

TRENDS  
6 MARCH 1974

- 1 -

## A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 25 FEBRUARY - 3 MARCH 1974

Moscow (3029 items)

Arab-Israeli Issue	(3%)	11%
[Gromyko in Syria and Egypt	(--)	7%]
Chilean Solidarity Week	(6%)	9%
China	(5%)	7%
Communique on Iraq's Saddam Husayn USSR Visit	(--)	3%

Peking (1076 items)

Algerian President Boumediene in PRC	(--)	20%*
Zambia President Kaunda in PRC	(13%)	9%
Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(9%)	8%
Indochina	(8%)	4%
27th Anniversary of Taiwan Uprising, 28 Feb	(--)	4%

NOTE: Beginning with this issue of the TRENDS the broadcast statistics will not list the percentage of Peking's weekly attention to domestic issues. During the past year, that Peking figure has averaged 47 percent, ranging from 29 to 60 percent. The percentage of Moscow radio comment on Soviet domestic affairs has averaged some 30 percent, ranging from 16 to 45 percent.

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* Reports on the Boumediene-Mao meeting totaled some 34 rebroadcasts but are not included in the figure because of their brevity.